Identity-based chameleon hashing and signatures without key exposure by Xiaofeng Chen, Xiaofeng et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Engineering and Information 
Sciences - Papers: Part A 
Faculty of Engineering and Information 
Sciences 
1-1-2014 
Identity-based chameleon hashing and signatures without key exposure 
Xiaofeng Xiaofeng Chen 
Xidian University 
Fangguo Zhang 
Sun Yat-Sen University, Xidian University 
Willy Susilo 
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au 
Haibo Tian 
Sun Yat-Sen University 
Jin Li 
Guangzhou University 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers 
 Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Xiaofeng Chen, Xiaofeng; Zhang, Fangguo; Susilo, Willy; Tian, Haibo; Li, Jin; and Kim, Kwangjo, "Identity-
based chameleon hashing and signatures without key exposure" (2014). Faculty of Engineering and 
Information Sciences - Papers: Part A. 2220. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/2220 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Identity-based chameleon hashing and signatures without key exposure 
Abstract 
The notion of chameleon hash function without key exposure plays an important role in designing secure 
chameleon signatures. However, all of the existing key-exposure free chameleon hash schemes are 
presented in the setting of certificate-based systems. In 2004, Ateniese and de Medeiros questioned 
whether there is an efficient construction for identity-based chameleon hashing without key exposure. In 
this paper, we propose the first identity-based chameleon hash scheme without key exposure based on 
the three-trapdoor mechanism, which provides an affirmative answer to the open problem. Moreover, we 
use the proposed chameleon hash scheme to design an identity-based chameleon signature scheme, 
which achieves all the desired security properties. 
Keywords 
hashing, signatures, without, exposure, chameleon, identity, key 
Disciplines 
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies 
Publication Details 
Chen, X., Zhang, F., Susilo, W., Tian, H., Li, J. & Kim, K. (2014). Identity-based chameleon hashing and 
signatures without key exposure. Information Sciences, 265 (May), 198-210. 
Authors 
Xiaofeng Xiaofeng Chen, Fangguo Zhang, Willy Susilo, Haibo Tian, Jin Li, and Kwangjo Kim 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/2220 
Identity-Based Chameleon Hashing and
Signatures Without Key Exposure
Xiaofeng Chen a, Fangguo Zhang b, Willy Susilo c, Haibo Tian b,
Jin Li d, Kwangjo Kim e
aState Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks (ISN),
Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, P.R.China
bSchool of Information Science and Technology,
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, P.R.China
cSchool of Computer Science and Software Engineering,
University of Wollongong, New South Wales 2522, Australia
dSchool of Computer Science and Educational Software,
Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, P.R.China
eDepartment of Computer Science, KAIST, Daejeon 305-714, KOREA
Abstract
The notion of chameleon hash function without key exposure plays an important
role in designing secure chameleon signatures. However, all of the existing key-
exposure free chameleon hash schemes are presented in the setting of certificate-
based systems. In 2004, Ateniese and de Medeiros questioned whether there is an
efficient construction for identity-based chameleon hashing without key exposure.
In this paper, we propose the first identity-based chameleon hash scheme without
key exposure based on the three-trapdoor mechanism, which provides an affirmative
answer to the open problem. Moreover, we use the proposed chameleon hash scheme
to design an identity-based chameleon signature scheme, which achieves all the
desired security properties.
Key words: Chameleon hashing, Identity-based system, Key exposure.
⋆ An extended abstract of this paper has been presented at the 15th Australasian
Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP), LNCS 6168, Springer,
pp.200-215, 2010.
∗ The corresponding author: Xiaofeng Chen (xfchen@xidian.edu.cn)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science 29 March 2013
1 Introduction
Chameleon signatures, introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [32], are based
on well established hash-and-sign paradigm, where a chameleon hash func-
tion is used to compute the cryptographic message digest. A chameleon hash
function is a trapdoor one-way hash function, which prevents everyone ex-
cept the holder of the trapdoor information from computing the collisions
for a randomly given input. Chameleon signatures simultaneously provide the
properties of non-repudiation and non-transferability for the signed message
as undeniable signatures [12] do, but the former allows for simpler and more
efficient realization than the latter. In particular, chameleon signatures are
non-interactive and less complicated. More precisely, the signer can generate
the chameleon signature without interacting with the designated recipient, and
the recipient will be able to verify the signature without the collaboration of
the signer. On the other hand, if presented with a forged signature, the signer
can deny its validity by only revealing certain values. That is, the forged-
signature denial protocol is also non-interactive. Besides, since the chameleon
signatures are based on well established hash-and-sign paradigm, it provides
more generic and flexible constructions.
One limitation of the original chameleon signature schemes [32] is that sig-
nature forgery (i.e., collision computation) results in the signer recovering
the recipient’s trapdoor information, i.e., the private key. This is named as
the key exposure problem of chameleon hashing, firstly addressed by Ateniese
and de Medeiros [1] in 2004. To illustrate this, we take the chameleon sig-
nature scheme employed for the Chaum-Pedersen trapdoor commitment as
the chameleon hash function for example. More precisely, a potential recipient
chooses and publishes a regular discrete logarithm-based public key y = gx,
where g is the generator of a cyclic group G and x is the secret key. Later,
a signer with the message m to be signed can compute the chameleon hash
value h = gmyr, where r is an auxiliary integer chosen uniformly at random by
the signer. Trivially, if the value of m is larger than the order of the group G,
we could first hash the message using a cryptographic hash function such as
SHA-1. Then the signer can compute the signature σ = SIGN(h), here SIGN
is any provable secure signature scheme. Given the triple (m, r, σ), the recip-
ient can verify the validity of the signature. However, any third party could
not be convinced of the fact since the recipient is capable of providing any
new collision (m′, r′) such that h = gm
′
yr
′
. Moreover, if the recipient provides
the original pair (m, r), the signer cannot repudiate his signature because he
cannot compute a new collision under the assumption of discrete logarithm in
G is intractable. Therefore, the chameleon signature scheme satisfies the prop-
erties of non-repudiation and non-transferability. On the other hand, with the
two pairs (m, r) and (m′, r′), the signer can recover the secret key x of the
recipient from the equation h = gmyr = gm
′
yr
′
, giving x = (m′−m)(r− r′)−1.
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This is a highly undesirable outcome from the recipient’s viewpoint. If the
signer knows the recipient’s trapdoor information, he then can use it to deny
other signatures given to the recipient. In the worst case, the signer could
collaborate with other individuals to invalidate any signatures which were
designated to be verified by the same public key. This will create a strong dis-
incentive for the recipient to compute the hash collisions. Therefore, a third
party is more likely to believe claims made by the recipient about presenting
an original (non-forged) signature and thus the property of non-transferability
of chameleon signature scheme is weakened.
Ateniese and de Medeiros [1] firstly introduced the idea of identity-based
chameleon hashing to solve this problem. Due to the distinguishing property
of identity-based systems [41], the signer can sign a message to an intended
recipient, without having to first retrieve the recipient’s certificate. Moreover,
the signer uses a different public key (corresponding to a different private
key) for each transaction with a recipient, so that signature forgery only re-
sults in the signer recovering the trapdoor information associated to a single
transaction. Therefore, the signer will not be capable of denying signatures on
any message in other transactions. However, this kind of transaction-specific
chameleon hash scheme still suffers from the key exposure problem unless an
identity is never reused in the different chameleon signatures, which requires
that the public/secret key pair of the recipient must be changed for each trans-
action. We argue that this idea only provides a partial solution for the key
exposure problem of chameleon hashing. 1
Chen et al. [17] proposed the first full construction of a key-exposure free
chameleon hash function in the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups with bilin-
ear pairings. Ateniese and de Medeiros [2] then presented three key-exposure
free chameleon hash functions, two based on the RSA assumption, as well
as a new construction based on bilinear pairings. Gao et al. [21] proposed
a factoring-based chameleon hash scheme without key exposure. However,
Chen et al. [20] presented some security flaws of the scheme and proposed an
improved chameleon hash scheme without key exposure based on factoring.
Recently, Gao et al. [22] also claimed to present a key-exposure free chameleon
hash scheme based on the Schnorr signature. Nevertheless, it requires an in-
teractive protocol between the signer and the recipient and thus violates the
basic definition of chameleon hashing and signatures. Besides, Chen et al. [18]
propose the first discrete logarithm based key-exposure free chameleon hash
scheme without using the GDH groups. However, we argue that all of the
above constructions are presented in the setting of certificate-based systems
where the public key infrastructure (PKI) is required.
1 A trivial solution for the key exposure problem is that the signer changes his key
pair frequently in the chameleon signature scheme. However, it is only meaningful
in theoretical sense because the key distribution problem arises simultaneously.
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Identity-based systems [41] can be an alternative for certificate-based public
key systems in some occasions, especially when efficient key management and
moderate security are required. Ateniese and de Medeiros [1] proposed the first
identity-based chameleon hashing and used it to design a sealed-bid auction
scheme. Zhang et al. [42] presented two identity-based chameleon hash schemes
from bilinear pairings. However, none of them is key-exposure free. As pointed
out by Ateniese and de Medeiros, the single-trapdoor commitment schemes
are not sufficient for the construction of key-exposure free chameleon hashing
and the double-trapdoor mechanism [26] can be used to construct either an
identity-based chameleon hash scheme or a key-exposure free one, but not
both. Therefore, an interesting open problem is whether there is an efficient
construction for identity-based chameleon hashing without key exposure [2].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose the first construction for
identity-based chameleon hashing without key exposure, which provides an af-
firmative answer to the open problem introduced by Ateniese and de Medeiros
in 2004. Moreover, the proposed chameleon hash scheme is proved to achieve
all the desired security notions in the random oracle model. We then use the
proposed chameleon hash scheme to design an identity-based chameleon sig-
nature scheme without key exposure.
1.1 Related Work
Digital signature is arguably one of the most significant applications of pub-
lic key cryptography. The ordinary digital signatures can be verified by any
intended recipient with the signer’s public key, i.e., universal verifiability. How-
ever, it may be undesirable in many business situations that a signature can
be verified universally. In the past two decades, there are plenty of researches
on the conflict between authenticity and privacy in the digital signatures. The
notion of undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen
[12], is such a kind of digital signature which enables the signer to decide
when his/her signature can be verified. An extended notion is designated con-
firmer signatures [11], where a designated confirmer, instead of the signer, can
be involved in the verification of the signature when the signer is inconvenient
to cooperate. In some applications, it is also important for the signer to decide
not only when but also by whom her signature can be verified. This is the mo-
tivation of the concept of designated verifier signatures [28]. The designated
verifier will trust the signer indeed signed a message with a proof of the signer.
However, he cannot present the proof to convince any third party because he is
fully capable of generating the same proof by himself (non-transferability). Ob-
viously, the two-party ring signatures [38] can provide an alternative solution
for designated verifier signatures. However, we argue that the designated ver-
ifier signatures (and two-party ring signatures) do not satisfy the property of
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non-repudiation, which is different from undeniable signatures and chameleon
signatures. Steinfeld et al. [40] introduced an extended notion named uni-
versal designated verifier signatures. Universal designated verifier signatures
allow any holder of the signature (not necessarily the signer) to designate the
signature to any desired designated verifier. Similarly, the verifier can be con-
vinced that the signer indeed generated the signature, but cannot transfer the
proof to convince any third party.
After initial work of Chaum and van Antwerpen [12], plenty of constructions
[3,10,11,14,16,23–25,28,30,31,35] for undeniable signatures based on various
assumptions have been proposed. Libert and Quisquater [33] proposed the first
provable secure undeniable signatures in the identity-based setting. Trivially,
identity-based chameleon signatures could provide more alternative solutions
for identity-based undeniable signatures. Unfortunately, both of the construc-
tions for identity-based chameleon signatures [1,42] suffer from the problem
of key exposure. Ateniese and de Medeiros [2] thus questioned whether there
is an efficient construction for identity-based chameleon hashing without key
exposure in 2004.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Some preliminaries are given in
Section 2. The definitions associated with identity-based chameleon hashing
are introduced in Section 3. The proposed identity-based key-exposure free
chameleon hash scheme and its security analysis are given in Section 4. The
resulting identity-based chameleon signature scheme is given in Section 5.
Finally, conclusions will be made in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce the basic definition and properties of bilinear
pairings and some well-known number-theoretic problems in the gap Diffie-
Hellman groups. We then present some proof systems for knowledge of discrete
logarithms.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings and Number-Theoretic Problems
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime
q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. Let a and b
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be elements of Z∗q . A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2 with the
following properties:
(1) Bilinear: e(aR, bQ) = e(R,Q)ab for all R,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q .
(2) Non-degenerate: There exists R and Q ∈ G1 such that e(R,Q) 6= 1.
(3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(R,Q) for all
R,Q ∈ G1.
In the following we introduce some problems in G1.
• Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two elements P and Q, to find
an integer n ∈ Z∗q , such that Q = nP whenever such an integer exists.
• Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given P, aP, bP for a, b ∈
Z∗q, to compute abP.
• Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): Given P, aP, bP, cP for a, b, c ∈
Z∗q, to decide whether c ≡ ab mod q.
It is proved that the CDHP and DDHP are not equivalent in the group G1
and thus called a gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. More precisely, we call
G a GDH group if the DDHP can be solved in polynomial time but there is
no polynomial time algorithm to solve the CDHP with non-negligible prob-
ability. The examples of such a group can be found in supersingular ellip-
tic curves or hyperelliptic curves over finite fields. For more details, see [4–
6,9,27,29,34,37]. Moreover, we call < P, aP, bP, cP > a valid Diffie-Hellman
tuple if c ≡ ab mod q.
Since the DDHP in the group G1 is easy, it cannot be used to design cryptosys-
tems in G1. Boneh and Franklin [6] introduced a new problem in (G1,G2, e)
named the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem:
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): Given P, aP, bP, cP for a, b, c ∈
Z∗q, to compute e(P, P )
abc ∈ G2.
Trivially, the BDHP in (G1,G2, e) is no harder than the CDHP in G1 or
G2. However, the converse is still an open problem. On the other hand, cur-
rently it seems that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the BDHP
in (G1,G2, e) with non-negligible probability. The security of our proposed
identity-based chameleon hash scheme without key exposure is also based on
the hardness of the BDHP in (G1,G2, e).
2.2 Proofs of Knowledge
A prover with possession a secret number x ∈ Zq wants to show a verifier
that x = logg y without exposing x. This is named the proof of knowledge of
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a discrete logarithm.
This proof of knowledge is basically a Schnorr signature [39] on message
(g, y): The prover chooses a random number r ∈R Zq, and then computes
c = H(g, y, gr), and s = r − cx mod q, where H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k is a
collision-resistant hash function. The verifier accepts the proof if and only if
c = H(g, y, gsyc).
Definition 1 A pair (c, s) ∈ {0, 1}k × Zq satisfying the equation
c = H(g, y, gsyc)
is a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm of the element y to the base g.
Similarly, we can define the proof of knowledge for the equality of two discrete
logarithms: A prover with possession a secret number x ∈ Zq wants to show
that x = logg u = logh v without exposing x.
Chaum and Pedersen [15] firstly proposed the proof as follows: The prover
chooses a random number r ∈R Zq, and then computes c = H(g, h, u, v, g
r, hr),
and s = r−cx mod q, where H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k is a collision-resistant hash
function. The verifier accepts the proof if and only if c = H(g, h, u, v, gsuc, hsvc).
Trivially, the verifier can efficiently decide whether < g, u, h, v > is a valid
Diffie-Hellman tuple with the pair (c, s).
Definition 2 A pair (c, s) ∈ {0, 1}k × Zq satisfying the equation
c = H(g, h, u, v, gsuc, hsvc)
is a proof of knowledge for the equality of two discrete logarithms of elements
u, v with respect to the base g, h.
The identity-based proof of knowledge for the equality of two discrete loga-
rithms, first introduced by Baek and Zheng [8] from bilinear pairings. Define
g = e(P, P ), u = e(P, SID), h = e(Q,P ) and v = e(Q, SID), where P and
Q are independent elements of G1, and SID is the private key of the prover
with identity information ID. The following non-interactive protocol presents
a proof of knowledge that logg u = logh v: The prover chooses a random num-
ber r ∈R Zq, and then computes c = H(g, h, u, v, g
r, hr), and S = rP − cSID,
where H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k is a collision-resistant hash function. The verifier
accepts the proof if and only if c = H(g, h, u, v, e(P, S)uc, e(Q, S)vc).
Definition 3 A pair (c, S) ∈ {0, 1}k ×G1 satisfying the equation
c = H(g, h, u, v, e(P, S)uc, e(Q, S)vc)
is an identity-based proof of knowledge for the equality of two discrete loga-
rithms of elements u, v with respect to the base g, h.
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3 Definitions
In this section, we introduce the formal definitions and security requirements
of identity-based chameleon hashing [1,2].
3.1 Identity-Based Chameleon Hashing
A chameleon hash function is a trapdoor collision-resistant hash function,
which is associated with a trapdoor/hash key pair (TK,HK). Anyone who
knows the public keyHK can efficiently compute the hash value for each input.
However, there exists no efficient algorithm for anyone except the holder of the
secret key TK, to find collisions for every given input. In the identity-based
chameleon hash scheme, the hash key HK is just the identity information
ID of the user. A trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG)
computes the trapdoor key TK associated with HK for the user.
Definition 4 An identity-based chameleon hash scheme consists of four effi-
ciently computable algorithms:
• Setup: PKG runs this probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to generate a
pair of secret/public keys (SK, PK) defining the scheme. PKG publishes the
system parameters SP including the public key PK, and keeps the secret key
SK as the master key. The input to this algorithm is a security parameter
k.
• Extract: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input the mas-
ter key SK and an identity string ID, outputs the trapdoor key TK associ-
ated to the hash key ID.
• Hash: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input the master
public key PK, an identity string ID, a customized identity L, 2 a message
m, and a random string r, 3 outputs the hash value h = Hash(PK, ID, L,m, r).
Note that h does not depend on TK and we denote h = Hash(ID, L,m, r)
for simplicity throughout this paper.
• Forge: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm F that, on input the trap-
door key TK associated to the identity string ID, a customized identity L,
a hash value h of a message m, a random string r, and another message
2 A customized identity is actually a label for each transaction. For example, we
can let L = IDS ||IDR||IDT , where IDS , IDR, and IDT denote the identity of the
signer, recipient, and transaction, respectively [1].
3 Note that r can be either a randomly chosen element in a finite space R, or a
bijective function of a random variant which is uniformly distributed in a domain
D.
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m′ 6= m, outputs a string r′ that satisfies
h = Hash(ID, L,m, r) = Hash(ID, L,m′, r′).
More precisely,
r′ = F(TK, ID, L, h,m, r,m′).
Moreover, if r is uniformly distributed in a finite space R, then the distri-
bution of r′ is computationally indistinguishable from uniform in R.
3.2 Security Requirements
The most dangerous attack on the identity-based chameleon hashing is the
recovery of either the master key SK or the trapdoor key TK. In this case,
the chameleon hash scheme would be totally broken. A weaker attack is that
an active adversary computes a collision of the chameleon hashing without the
knowledge of the trapdoor TK. In this security model, the adversary is allowed
to compromise various users and obtain their secrets, and makes queries to the
algorithm Extract on the adaptively chosen identity strings except the target
one. Therefore, the first essential requirement for identity-based chameleon
hashing is the collision resistance against active attackers.
Definition 5 (Collision resistance against active attackers): Let ID be a tar-
get identity string and m be a target message. Let k be the security parame-
ter. The chameleon hash scheme is collision resistance against active attack-
ers if, for all non-constant polynomials f1() and f2(), there exists no effi-
cient algorithm A that, on input a customized identity L, outputs a message
m′ 6= m, and two random strings r and r′ such that Hash(ID, L,m′, r′) =
Hash(ID, L,m, r), with non-negligible probability. Suppose that A runs in time
less than f1(k), and makes at most f2(k) queries to the Extract oracle on the
adaptively chosen identity strings other than ID.
The second requirement for identity-based chameleon hashing is the semantic
security, i.e., the chameleon hash value does not reveal anything about the
possible message that was hashed.
Definition 6 (Semantic security): Let H [X ] denote the entropy of a random
variable X, and H [X|Y ] the entropy of the variable X given the value of a
random function Y of X. Semantic security is the statement that the condi-
tional entropy H [m|h] of the message given its chameleon hash value h equals
the total entropy H [m] of the message space.
The identity-based chameleon hashing must also be key-exposure free. It was
pointed out that all key-exposure free chameleon hash schemes must have (at
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least) double trapdoors: a master trapdoor, and an ephemeral trapdoor asso-
ciated with a customized identity [2]. Loosely speaking, key exposure freeness
means that even if the adversaryA has obtained polynomially many ephemeral
trapdoors associated with the corresponding customized identities, there is no
efficient algorithm for A to compute a new ephemeral trapdoor. Formally, we
have the following definition.
Definition 7 (Key exposure freeness): If a recipient with identity ID has
never computed a collision under a customized identity L, then there is no
efficient algorithm for an adversary A to find a collision for a given chameleon
hash value Hash(ID, L,m, r). This must remain true even if the adversary A
has oracle access to F and is allowed polynomially many queries on triples
(Lj , mj, rj) of his choice, except that Lj is not allowed to equal the challenge
L.
4 Identity-based Key-exposure Free Chameleon Hashing
All of the existing identity-based chameleon hash schemes [1,42] are based on
the double-trapdoor mechanism and suffer from the key exposure problem. In
more detail, there are two trapdoors in these chameleon hash schemes: One is
the master key x of PKG, and the other is the secret key SID of the user with
identity information ID (In identity-based systems, SID is actually a signa-
ture of PKG on message ID with the secret key x). Given a collision of the
chameleon hash function, the trapdoor key SID will be revealed. Ateniese and
de Medeiros [2] thus concluded that the double-trapdoor mechanism cannot
be used to construct an efficient chameleon hash scheme that is simultane-
ously identity-based and key-exposure free, but the multiple-trapdoor (more
than two, and consecutive trapdoors) mechanism perhaps could provide such
a construction.
In this section, we first propose an identity-based key-exposure free chameleon
hash scheme based on bilinear pairings. There are three consecutive trapdoors
in our chameleon hash scheme: The first one is the master key x of PKG, the
second one is the secret key SID = xH(ID) of the user with identity informa-
tion ID, and the third one is the ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SID) for each
transaction with the customized identity L. Given a collision of the chameleon
hash function, only the ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SID) is revealed, but the
permanent trapdoors x and SID still remain secret. Actually, even given poly-
nomially many ephemeral trapdoors e(H(Li), SID) associated with the label
Li, it is infeasible to compute a new ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SID) associ-
ated with the label L 6= Li. Trivially, it is more difficult to compute the trap-
door x or SID. Therefore, the identity information ID and the corresponding
secret key SID can be used repeatedly for different transactions.
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4.1 The Proposed Identity-based Chameleon Hash Scheme
• Setup: Let k be a security parameter. Let G1 be a GDH group generated
by P , whose order is a prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group
of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 be a full-domain collision-resistant hash function [7,13,36].
PKG picks a random integer x ∈R Z
∗
q and computes Ppub = xP . The system
parameters are SP = {G1,G2, q, e, P, Ppub, H, k}.
• Extract: Given an identity string ID, computes the trapdoor key SID =
xH(ID) = xQID.
• Hash: On input the hash key ID, a customized identity L, a message m,
chooses a random integer a ∈R Z
∗
q , and computes r = (aP, e(aPpub, QID)).
Our proposed chameleon hash function is defined as
H = Hash(ID, L,m, r) = aP +mH(L).
Note that H does not depend on the trapdoor key SID. Besides, if a is a
uniformly random integer in Z∗q , then the string r = (aP, e(aPpub, QID)) can
be viewed as a random input of the chameleon hash function H. We argue
that a is not an input ofH. Furthermore, it is essential to ensure the validity
of randomness r. That is, the equation logP aP = loge(Ppub,QID) e(aPpub, QID)
must hold. For more details, please refer to Remark 1.
• Forge: For any valid hash value H, the algorithm F can be used to compute
a string r′ with the trapdoor key SID as follows:
r′ = F(SID, ID, L,H, m, aP, e(aPpub, QID), m
′) = (a′P, e(a′Ppub, QID)),
where
a′P = aP + (m−m′)H(L),
e(a′Ppub, QID) = e(aPpub, QID)e(H(L), SID)
m−m′ .
Note that
Hash(ID, L,m′, a′P, e(a′Ppub, QID)) = Hash(ID, L,m, aP, e(aPpub, QID))
and
e(a′Ppub, QID) = e(a
′P, SID)
= e(aP + (m−m′)H(L), SID)
= e(aP, SID)e(H(L), SID)
m−m′
= e(aPpub, QID)e(H(L), SID)
m−m′
Therefore, the forgery is successful. Moreover, if (aP, e(aPpub, QID)) is uni-
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formly distributed, then the distribution of (a′P, e(a′Ppub, QID)) is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from uniform.
Remark 1. Given a string r = (aP, e(aPpub, QID)), a necessary condition is the
equality of two discrete logarithms of elements aP and e(aPpub, QID) with re-
spect to the base P and e(Ppub, QID), i.e., logP aP = loge(Ppub,QID) e(aPpub, QID).
Obviously, the holder R of the trapdoor key SID can be convinced of the fact
if the equation e(aP, SID) = e(aPpub, QID) holds: If e(aP, SID) = e(aPpub, QID)
holds, then we have logP aP = loge(P,SID) e(aP, SID) = loge(P,SID) e(aPpub, QID)
= loge(Ppub,QID) e(aPpub, QID).
In the chameleon signatures, it is also essential for any third party (e.g., a
Judge) without knowing SID to verify the validity of r. Due to the identity-
based knowledge proof for the equality of two discrete logarithms in section 2.2,
R can prove that < e(P, P ), e(Ppub, QID), e(aP, P ), e(aPpub, QID) > is a valid
Diffie-Hellman tuple. If < e(P, P ), e(Ppub, QID), e(aP, P ), e(aPpub, QID) > is a
valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, then< e(P, P ), e(aP, P ), e(Ppub, QID), e(aPpub, QID) >
is also a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. So, we have logP aP = loge(P,P ) e(aP, P ) =
loge(Ppub,QID) e(aPpub, QID). Moreover, it also holds for any other string r
′ =
(a′P, e(a′Ppub, QID)). That is to say, for any given string r
′, R can prove that
< e(P, P ), e(Ppub, QID), e(a
′P, P ), e(a′Ppub, QID) > is a valid Diffie-Hellman
tuple in a computationally indistinguishable way. For more details, please re-
fer to section 5.
4.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 1 In the random oracle model, the proposed identity-based chameleon
hash scheme is collision resistance against active attackers under the assump-
tion that the BDHP in (G1,G2, e) is intractable.
Proof. Given a random instance < P, xP, yP, zP > of BDHP, the aim of algo-
rithm B is to compute e(P, P )xyz. B runs the Setup algorithm of the proposed
identity-based chameleon hash scheme and sets Ppub = xP . The resulting sys-
tem parameters {G1,G2, q, e, P,H, k, Ppub} are given to the adversary A. The
security analysis will view H as a random oracle.
Let ID be the target identity string and m be the target message. Suppose
that A makes at most f1(k) queries to the Extract oracle, where f1(k) is a
non-constant polynomial. B randomly chooses bi ∈ Z
∗
q for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , f1(k)},
and responds to the H query and Extract query of A as follows:
H(L) = yP
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H(IDi) =





biP, if IDi 6= ID
zP, Otherwise
SIDi =





biPpub, if IDi 6= ID
“Fail”, Otherwise
ifA can output a messagem′ 6= m, and two strings r = (aP, e(aPpub, QID)) and
r′ = (a′P, e(a′Ppub, QID)) such that Hash(ID, L,m
′, r′) = Hash(ID, L,m, r) in
time T with a non-negligible probability ǫ, then B can compute
e(H(L), SID) = (e(a
′Ppub, QID)/e(aPpub, QID))
(m−m′)−1
in time T as the solution of the BDHP in (G1,G2, e). The success of probability
of B is also ǫ.
Theorem 2 The proposed identity-based chameleon hash scheme is semanti-
cally secure.
Proof. Given an identity ID and a customized identity L, there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the hash value H = Hash(ID, L,m, r) and the
string r = (aP, e(aPpub, QID)) for each message m. Therefore, the conditional
probability µ(m|H) = µ(m|r). Note that m and r are independent variables,
the equation µ(m|H) = µ(m) holds. Then, we can prove that the conditional
entropy H [m|H] equals the entropy H [m] as follows:
H [m|H] = −
∑
m
∑
H
µ(m,H) log(µ(m|H)) = −
∑
m
∑
H
µ(m,H) log(µ(m))
= −
∑
m
µ(m) log(µ(m)) = H [m].
Theorem 3 In the random oracle model, the proposed identity-based chameleon
hash scheme is key-exposure free under the assumption that the BDHP in
(G1,G2, e) is intractable.
Proof. Loosely speaking, the ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SID) can be viewed
as the partial signature on message L in the Libert and Quisquater’s identity-
based undeniable signature scheme [33]. Also, in the random oracle model,
their undeniable signature scheme is proved secure against existential forgery
on adaptively chosen message and ID attacks under the assumption that the
BDHP in (G1,G2, e) is intractable. That is, even if the adversary has obtained
polynomially many signatures e(H(Lj), SID) on message Lj , he cannot forge
a signature e(H(L), SID) on message L 6= Lj . So, our chameleon hash scheme
satisfies the property of key exposure freeness.
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Now we give the formal proof of our chameleon hash scheme in details. Given
a random instance < P, xP, yP, zP > of BDHP, the aim of algorithm B is
to compute e(P, P )xyz using the adversary A. B firstly provides A the sys-
tem parameters {G1,G2, q, e, P,H, k, Ppub} such that Ppub = xP . The security
analysis will view H as a random oracle.
Note that in our chameleon hash scheme, the ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SID)
can be used to compute a collision (m′, r′) of the given chameleon hash value
H in any desired way. On the other hand, any collision (m′, r′) will result in
the recovery of the ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SID). For the ease of explana-
tion, in the following we let the output of the algorithm F be the ephemeral
trapdoor e(H(L), SID) instead of a collision (m
′, r′), i.e., F(·) = e(H(L), SID).
Let IDt and Lt be the target identity and customized identity, respectively.
We stress that Lt is a label only related to the target identity IDt. That is,
(IDi, Lt) cannot be the input of the query to oracle F for any other identity
IDi 6= IDt. Suppose that A makes at most f(k) queries to the Extract or-
acle, where f(k) is a non-constant polynomial. For each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , f(k)},
assume that A makes at most gi(k) queries to the F oracle on four-tuple
(Lij , mij , aijP, e(aijPpub, QIDi)) of his choice, where gi(k) are non-constant
polynomials and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , gi(k)}. That is, A could obtain gi(k) ephemeral
trapdoors e(H(Lij ), SIDi) for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , f(k)}. At the end of the game,
A outputs a collision of the hash valueH = Hash(IDt, Lt, m, aP, e(aPpub, QIDt))
where Lt 6= Ltj and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , gt(k)}, i.e., a new ephemeral trapdoor
e(H(Lt), SIDt) for H(Lt) 6= H(Ltj ).
B randomly chooses bi ∈ Z
∗
q and cij ∈ Z
∗
q for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , f(k)}, j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , gi(k)}, and then responds to the H query, Extract query, and F
query of A as follows:
H(Lij) =





cijP, if Lij 6= Lt
yP, Otherwise
H(IDi) =





biP, if IDi 6= IDt
zP, Otherwise
SIDi =





biPpub, if IDi 6= IDt
“Fail”, Otherwise
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F(·) =













e(cijP, biPpub), if IDi 6= IDt
e(ctjPpub, zP ), if IDi = IDt and Lij 6= Lt
“Fail”, if IDi = IDt and Lij = Lt
We say A wins the game if A outputs a new valid trapdoor e(H(Lt), SIDt)
in time T with a non-negligible probability ǫ. Note that e(H(Lt), SIDt) =
e(P, P )xyz, so B can solve the BDHP in (G1,G2, e) in time T with the same
probability ǫ.
5 Identity-based Chameleon Signature Scheme
Chameleon signatures are based on well established hash-and-sign paradigm,
and thus we can construct an identity-based chameleon signature scheme with-
out key exposure by incorporating the proposed identity-based chameleon hash
scheme Hash and any provable secure identity-based signature scheme SIGN
against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and ID attacks such
as [9,27]. There are two users, a signer S and a recipient R, in the identity-
based chameleon signature scheme. When dispute occurs, a judge J is involved
in the scheme. In the following, we present the formal definition of identity-
based chameleon signatures.
5.1 Precise Definition
Definition 8 An identity-based chameleon signature scheme without key ex-
posure consists of the following efficient algorithms and a specific denial pro-
tocol:
• Setup: PKG runs this probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to generate a
pair of secret/public keys (SK, PK) defining the scheme. PKG publishes the
system parameters SP including the public key PK, and keeps the secret key
SK as the master key. The input to this algorithm is a security parameter
k.
• Extract: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input the mas-
ter key SK and an identity string ID, outputs the trapdoor key TK associ-
ated to the hash key ID.
• Sign: An efficient probabilistic algorithm that, on input the public key IDR
of the recipient R, the secret key SIDS of the signer S, a message m, a
customized identity L, and a random integer a ∈ Z∗q, outputs a signature
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σ = SIGNSIDS (H) on the chameleon hash value H = Hash(IDR, L,m, r),
where r is a bijective function of the random variant a.
• Verify: An efficient deterministic algorithm that, on input the public key
IDR of the recipient R, the public key IDS of the signer, a message m, a
customized identity L, a value r, and a chameleon signature σ, outputs a
verification decision b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Deny: A non-interactive protocol between the signer and the judge. Given
a signature σ on the message m′, the signer computes a different collision
(m∗, r∗) and some auxiliary information Π∗. If and only if m∗ 6= m′ and Π∗
is valid, the judge claims that the signature on the message m′ is a forgery.
Inherently, a secure (identity-based) chameleon signature scheme should sat-
isfy the following properties [1,17,32]:
• Unforgeability: No party can produce a valid chameleon signature not
previously generated by the signer. Also, the recipient can only produce a
forgery of a chameleon signature previously generated by the signer.
• Non-transferability: The recipient can not convince a third party that the
signer indeed generated a signature on a certain message, thus the signature
is not universal verifiable.
• Non-repudiation: The signer cannot deny legitimate signature claims.
• Deniability: The signer can deny a forgery of the signature.
• Message hiding: The signer does not have to reveal the original message
to deny the validity of a forgery.
• Message recovery (or Convertibility): A variant of the chameleon sig-
nature can be transformed into a regular signature by the signer.
5.2 The Proposed Signature Scheme
• Setup: Let k be a security parameter. Let G1 be a GDH group generated
by P , whose order is a prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group
of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 be a full-domain collision-resistant hash function. PKG
picks a random integer x ∈R Z
∗
q and computes Ppub = xP . The system
parameters are SP = {G1,G2, q, e, P, Ppub, H, k}.
• Extract: Given an identity string ID, computes the trapdoor key SID =
xH(ID) = xQID. Let (SIDS , IDS) be the signing/verification key pair of S,
and (SIDR, IDR) be the trapdoor/hash key pair of R.
• Sign: Given a message m and a customized identity L, S randomly chooses
an integer a ∈R Z
∗
q , and computes r = (aP, e(aPpub, QIDR)). The signature
on the chameleon hash value H = Hash(IDR, L,m, r) is σ = SIGNSIDS (H).
• Verify: Given a four-tuple (m, r, L, σ), R first uses his trapdoor key SIDR
to verify whether the equation e(aP, SIDR) = e(aPpub, QIDR) holds. If the
verification fails, he rejects the signature; else, he computes the chameleon
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hash value H = Hash(IDR, L,m, r) and verifies the validity of SIGNSIDS (H)
with the verification key IDS.
• Deny:When dispute occurs,R provides J a four-tuple (m′, r′, L, SIGNSIDS (H))
such that H = Hash(IDR, L,m
′, r′) and a non-interactive identity-based
proof of knowledge Π′ for the equality of two discrete logarithms that
loge(P,P ) e(Ppub, QIDR) = loge(a′P,P ) e(a
′Ppub, QIDR). If either SIGNSIDS (H)
or Π′ is invalid, J rejects it. Otherwise, J summons S to accept/deny the
claim. If S wants to accept the signature, he just confirms to J this fact.
Otherwise, he provides a collision of the chameleon hash function as follows:
· If S wants to achieve the property of “message recovery”, i.e., he wants
to prove which message was the one originally signed. In this case, S
provides J the triple (m, r,Π) as a collision, where Π is a non-interactive
proof of knowledge for the equality of two discrete logarithms that a =
loge(P,P ) e(aP, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(aPpub, QIDR). If and only if m 6= m
′,
H = Hash(IDR, L,m, r), and Π is valid, then J can be convinced that R
forged the signature on message m′ and S only generated a valid signature
on message m.
· If S wants to achieve the property of “message hiding”, i.e., he wants to
protect the confidentiality of the original message even against J . In this
case, S provides J the tuple (m∗, r∗) such that H = Hash(IDR, L,m
∗, r∗)
as a collision. Note that given two pairs (m, r) and (m′, r′) such that H =
Hash(IDR, L,m
′, r′) = Hash(IDR, L,m, r), S can compute the ephemeral
trapdoor
e(H(L), SIDR) = (e(a
′Ppub, QIDR)/e(aPpub, QIDR))
(m−m′)−1 .
Given a random message m∗, the string r∗ = (a∗P, e(a∗Ppub, QIDR)) can
be computed as follows: a∗P = aP + (m − m∗)H(L), e(a∗Ppub, QIDR) =
e(aPpub, QIDR)e(H(L), SIDR)
m−m∗ . If R accepts the collision (m∗, r∗), J
can be convinced that R forged the signature on message m′ and the orig-
inal message m is never revealed. Otherwise, R provides a non-interactive
knowledge proof that r∗ is not valid: Let r∗ = (U, V ), R provide a value
W 6= V and a non-interactive knowledge proof that loge(P,P ) e(Ppub, QIDR) =
loge(U,P )W , then J can be convinced that S generated a valid signature
on message m′. 4
Remark 2. The Verify algorithm in our proposed identity-based chameleon
signature scheme is non-interactive, i.e., R can verify the signature without
the collaboration of S. However, the signature verification must require the
collaboration of the signer in the identity-based undeniable signature scheme
4 We must consider the case that R provides the original collision (m, r) (that is,
(m′, r′) = (m, r)) while S provides an invalid collision (m∗, r∗) to cheat J . Note
that if loge(P,P ) e(Ppub, QIDR) = loge(U,P )W , then we have W = e(U,SIDR) =
e(a∗P, SIDR). Trivially, V 6= e(a
∗Ppub, QIDR). This means that the tuple (m
∗, r∗)
provide by S is not a valid collision.
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[33]. That is, it is interactive even if the confirm protocol [33] only uses non-
interactive designated-verifier knowledge proof. Moreover, our proposed sig-
nature scheme is based on the well established hash-and-sign paradigm and
thus can provide more flexible constructions.
Remark 3. Note that if (g, ga, gb, gab) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, then
(g, gb, ga, gab) is also a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, vice versa. That is, there
are two different ways (based on the knowledge a or b, respectively) to prove
that (g, ga, gb, gab) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple when using the proof of
knowledge for the equality of two discrete logarithms: logg g
a = loggb g
ab or
logg g
b = logga g
ab. This is the main trick of theDeny protocol in our signature
scheme. We explain it in more details.
For any random string r′ = (a′P, e(a′Ppub, QIDR)), R cannot provide a proof
that logP a
′P = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(a′Ppub, QIDR) since he never knows the value
of a′. However, R (with the knowledge of SIDR) could provide a proof that
loge(P,P ) e(Ppub, QIDR) = loge(a′P,P ) e(a
′Ppub, QIDR).
That is, loge(P,P ) e(a
′P, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(a′Ppub, QIDR). So, we can easily
deduce that logP a
′P = loge(P,P ) e(a
′P, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(a′Ppub, QIDR). In
particular, this also holds even when r′ = r. That is, the original input r is
totally indistinguishable with any collision r′. Moreover, we stress that it is
NOT required for R to know the value a′ (or a in the case of r′ = r) in the
knowledge proof that loge(P,P ) e(Ppub, QIDR) = loge(a′P,P ) e(a
′Ppub, QIDR).
On the other hand, note that only S knows the knowledge a and no one knows
the knowledge a′ 6= a. Therefore, only S can provide a proof of knowledge that
a = loge(P,P ) e(aP, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(aPpub, QIDR), and no one can provide
a proof of knowledge that a′ = loge(P,P ) e(a
′P, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(a′Ppub, QIDR)
when a′ 6= a. This ensures that S can efficiently prove which message was the
original one if he desires.
5.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 4 The proposed chameleon signature scheme satisfies the property
of unforgeability.
Proof. Due to the well established hash-and-sign paradigm, no third party can
produce a valid chameleon signature of S. Otherwise, the adversary can either
break the underlying signature scheme SIGN, or find a valid collision of the
chameleon hash function Hash. However, SIGN is a provable secure identity-
based signature scheme against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message
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and ID attacks, and Hash is collision resistance against active attackers under
the assumption that the BDHP in (G1,G2, e) is intractable.
On the other hand, it is trivial that R can only produce a forgery of a
chameleon signature previously generated by S. However, it is meaningless
since J can detect this forgery after S provides a different collision of the
chameleon hashing.
Theorem 5 The proposed chameleon signature scheme satisfies the property
of non-transferability.
Proof. The semantic security of the proposed chameleon hash scheme implies
the non-transferability of the resulting chameleon signature scheme [1].
Theorem 6 The proposed chameleon signature scheme satisfies the property
of non-repudiation.
Proof. If R provides J a valid four-tuple (m, r, L, SIGNSIDS (H)) previously
generated by S, then S cannot provide a valid collision of the chameleon hash
function since it is equivalent to solve the the BDHP in (G1,G2, e) as proved
in theorem 1. Therefore, S must confirm to J that he indeed generated the
signature.
Theorem 7 The proposed chameleon signature scheme satisfies the property
of deniability.
Proof. It is ensured by the denial protocol. If the dispute occurs, S can provide
J a new collision of the chameleon hash function to deny the signature forgery
of R.
Theorem 8 The proposed chameleon signature scheme satisfies the property
of message hiding.
Proof. As pointed out in section 5.2, given two valid collisions (m, r) and
(m′, r′) such that H = Hash(IDR, L,m
′, r′) = Hash(IDR, L,m, r), S can com-
pute the ephemeral trapdoor e(H(L), SIDR) and then provide J a new collision
(m∗, r∗) for any randomly chosen message m∗. The original message m is never
revealed. However, it requires the cooperation of R to prove the fact when r∗
is not valid.
In the following, we give a new solution to achieve the property of mes-
sage hiding while R is never involved in the Deny protocol. The trick is
that we can use the so-called blinding technique for the original collision of
chameleon hashing. S chooses a random blinding factor θ ∈R Z
∗
q and computes
m∗ = θm, a∗ = θa, and H∗ = a∗P + m∗H(L), S then provides J the four-
tuple (m∗, r∗,Σ,Π) as a new collision, where r∗ = (a∗P, e(a∗Ppub, QIDR)), Σ is
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a non-interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm that θ = logH H
∗,
and Π is a non-interactive proof of knowledge for the equality of two discrete
logarithms that a∗ = loge(P,P ) e(a
∗P, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(a∗Ppub, QIDR). If
and only if m′H∗ 6= m∗H, and Σ and Π are both valid, then J can be con-
vinced that R forged the signature on message m′ and the original message
m is still confidential. The reason is as follows: if H∗ = θH, then the pair
(θ−1m∗, θ−1a∗) is equal to the original tuple (m, a) of S due to the hardness
of discrete logarithm assumption. Otherwise, we have two distinct represen-
tations of H with respect to the base (P,H(L)). Then we could compute the
discrete logarithm logP H(L) while H(L) can be viewed a random element in
G1. Besides, m
′H∗ 6= m∗H implies m 6= m′. This means that S is capable of
providing a new collision (m, r) different from (m′, r′). Due to the randomness
of θ, the original message m is kept secret in the sense of semantic security.
Theorem 9 The proposed chameleon signature scheme satisfies the property
of message recovery.
Proof. The enhanced schemes [1,17,32] can be converted into universally ver-
ifiable instances. The trick is that the signer encrypts the message using a
semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme ENC and then includes
the ciphertext in the signature. However, as noted in [1], this solution does
not provide the recipient with a mechanism for adjudicated convertibility, be-
cause the recipient has no guarantee that the signer has encrypted the correct
information during the signing step.
In our proposed chameleon signature scheme, note that only S can provide
a knowledge proof that a = loge(P,P ) e(aP, P ) = loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(aPpub, QIDR),
and no one can provide a knowledge proof that a′ = loge(P,P ) e(a
′P, P ) =
loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(a′Ppub, QIDR) when a
′ 6= a. Therefore, given a valid four-tuple
(m, r, L, SIGNSIDS (H)) and a proof of knowledge that a = loge(P,P ) e(aP, P )
= loge(Ppub,QIDR)
e(aPpub, QIDR), any verifier can be convinced that the original
message to be signed is m. That is, our proposed solution provides more
efficient and explicit convertibility.
5.4 Comparison
Compared with the existing identity-based chameleon signature schemes [1,42],
our proposed scheme is as efficient as them in the Sign andVerify algorithms.
While in the Deny protocol, it requires a (very) little more computation and
communication cost for the non-interactive proofs of knowledge. However,
none of the schemes [1,42] is key-exposure free. Currently, it seems that our
proposed scheme is the unique choice for the efficient and secure identity-based
chameleon signature scheme in the real applications.
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Since both undeniable signatures and chameleon signatures can simultane-
ously satisfy the properties of non-repudiation and non-transferability, we
compare the proposed identity-based chameleon signature scheme with Libert-
Quisquater’s identity-based undeniable signature scheme [33]. The Setup and
Extract algorithms are the same in the both schemes. The Verify algorithm
in our proposed signature scheme is non-interactive, while the confirm pro-
tocol of [33] requires the collaboration of the signer to verify the signature.
The Deny protocol is non-interactive in both signature schemes. However,
our proposed scheme is superior to [33] in the computation cost.
Table 1 presents the comparison between Libert-Quisquater’s identity-based
undeniable signature scheme and our identity-based chameleon signature scheme.
We denote by P a computation of the pairing, by M a scalar multiplication
in G1, and by E a modular exponentiation in G2. We omit other operations
such as point addition, modular multiplication, and hash in both schemes.
Scheme [33] Our Scheme
Computation (Sign) 1P 1P + 4M
Computation (Verify) S: 4P + 1M + 1E S: /
R: 4P + 1M + 3E R: 3P + 2M
Proof Computation (Deny) S: 5P + 1M + 4E S: 2P + 5M + 2E
Proof Verification (Deny) R: 4P + 4E J: 3P + 4M + 4E
Assumption BDHP; Random Oracle BDHP; Random Oracle
Convertiblity Explicit Explicit
Construction Specific Flexible
Table 1. Comparison with identity-based undeniable signature scheme
6 Conclusions
Chameleon signatures simultaneously provide the properties of non-repudiation
and non-transferability for the signed message, thus can be used to solve
the conflict between authenticity and privacy in the digital signatures. How-
ever, the original constructions suffer from the so-called key exposure prob-
lem of chameleon hashing. Recently, some constructions of key-exposure free
chameleon hash schemes [2,17] are presented using the idea of “Customized
Identities” while in the setting of certificate-based systems. Besides, all of the
existing identity-based chameleon hash schemes suffer from the key exposure
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problem. To the best of our knowledge, there seems no research work on the
identity-based chameleon hash scheme without key exposure.
In this paper, we propose the first identity-based chameleon hash scheme with-
out key exposure, which gives an affirmative answer for the open problem
introduced by Ateniese and de Medeiros in 2004. Moreover, we use the pro-
posed chameleon hash scheme to design an identity-based chameleon signature
scheme, which achieves all the desired security properties.
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